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Introduction 
War is said to be as old as humanity. At all 
times, human beings fought for their lands, 
for their gods, for their culture. The 21st 
century is no exception: it already witnessed 
ninety wars and conflicts; sixty being still 
ongoing around the world. Thus, one may 
wonder: Is the Syrian conflict one among 
many? It appears that the Syrian case is 
peculiar from the many conflicts that have 
been dividing the world since the end of the 
Cold War. It stirred up debates and 
controversy, led to the involvement of the 
most powerful powers within and outside of 
the Middle Eastern region, and to the 
creation of as many as 1,000 armed 
opposition groups commanding an estimated 
100,000 fighters.1  
On the humanitarian front, Syrian refugees 
were already 1 million in March 2013 and 
their number reached 3 million in July 2014 
after the utilisation of chemical weapons by 
Bashar al-Assad against the Syrian 
population and after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
declared himself the caliph of the Islamic 
State.2 As of June 2018, the UN Refugee 
Agency (UNHCR) has registered over 5,6 
million refugees from Syria and estimated 
that there are over 6,6 million internally 
displaced persons (IDP) within Syria's 
borders. In Syria, fighting continue in spite 
of international agreements for de-
escalation. Humanitarian access remains 
limited and 2,9 million Syrians are still 
surviving in hard-to-reach areas. 
Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq are hosting the largest 
populations of Syrian refugees, many of 
whom attempt to journey onwards to Europe 
in search of better conditions. None of those 
main host countries signed the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, which defines the status of 
refugee and sets the requirements for legal 
identification and rights of refugees. 
This article is the first of two papers which 
offer an overview of the existing literature 
and available data on the socioeconomic and 
political impact of Syrian refugees on Jordan 
and Lebanon. They also review the 
countries’ mechanisms of coping with the 
rapid influx of the refugee population from 
Syria. 
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The History of 
Refugees in Jordan 
before the Syrian 
Confl ict 
Rampant instability in the Middle Eastern 
region led Jordan to be one of the main hosts 
of refugees from numerous countries. Since 
the independence of the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Transjordan in 1946, the 
country has witnessed two major refugee 
influxes.  
Palestinian Refugees After the 1948 and 
1967 Wars  
The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 
led to a massive departure of 506,200 
Palestinians to Jordan.3 Palestinian refugees 
were rapidly integrated into the Jordanian 
society. According to article 3 of the 1954 
Jordanian Citizenship Law, a Jordanian 
national is: “Any person with previous 
Palestinian nationality except the Jews 
before the date of May 15, 1948 residing in 
the kingdom during the period from 
December 20, 1949 and February 16, 
1954”.4 Palestinians were granted Jordanian 
nationality on the basis of this law. 
In 1967, the military occupation of the West 
bank, Golan Heights and Gaza Strip by 
Israel (El Nakseh War) led to a second wave 
of refugees in Jordan. The kingdom 
welcomed another 390,000 refugees and 
displaced persons – 345,000 from the West 
Bank and 45,000 from the Gaza Strip.5 
The massive arrival of Palestinians in just 
two decades led to tensions between the 
Palestinian population, the government, and 
the Jordanians, which resulted in the “Black 
September” in 1970. In the context of the 
conflict between Jordanian Armed Forced 
led by King Hussein and the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) under the 
leadership of Yasser Arafat, refugee camps 
were attacked and thousands of Palestinians 
were killed.6 
According to the United Nation Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East (UNRWA), more than 2 million 
Palestinian refugees were living in Jordan in 
2017. All but 167,000 have citizenship and 
are fully eligible for government services 
including education and health care.7 
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Iraqi Refugees After the 1991 and 2003 
Wars  
The first wave of Iraqi refugees arrived in 
the 1990s in the aftermath of the 1991 
Kuwait Crisis, following Saddam's brutal 
repression of Iraqi Shi'a and Kurds and the 
imposition of economic sanctions over the 
country. Before 2003, between 250,000 and 
350,000 Iraqis were thought to have found 
refuge in Jordan.8 This figure includes not 
only Iraqi refugees, but also long-term Iraqi 
residents who had remained in Jordan to 
work. 
Iraqis did not enjoy the level of integration 
of the Palestinians in Jordan. Their presence 
brought the fear of a growing Shia presence, 
even though Shias represented only 17% of 
Iraqi refugees. The spectre of Iran's 
influence in Jordan led the authorities to 
prevent Iraqis from visiting historic shrines, 
to ban the opening of new huseiniyat 
(houses for prayers), and to foster non-Shia 
religious education.9 
After the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, large 
numbers of refugees fled to Jordan. Unlike 
the first wave of refugees following Kuwait 
Crisis, the second wave of Iraqi refugees 
were referred to as an “invisible” refugee 
population10. On the one hand, they were 
treated by the kingdom as “guests” instead 
of “refugees”. On the other hand, most of 
them were middle class urbanites and 
businessmen, and thus, able to resettle in 
Jordan without the help of the UNHCR. 
However, 2005 terrorists’ attacks committed 
by Iraqis combined with the memory of 
Black Friday led to the securitisation of Iraqi 
refugees. Jordan breached the principle of 
non-refoulement, deported and detained 
Iraqi refugees in large number. 
While difficult to identify those “invisible” 
refugees, the UNHCR estimates that 
750,000 to 1 million Iraqis have fled to 
Jordan before the onset of the conflict 
against IS.11 The atrocities committed by the 
jihadi group are thought to have brought 
more than 63,000 Iraqis to Jordan since 
February 2013.12 
Jordan’s policy to deal with Iraqi refugees is 
particularly interesting to understand the 
kingdom’s current strategy for Syrian 
refugees. In response to the successive 
influxes of Iraqis, Jordan chose not to 
establish refugee camps. It affected the 
country’s ability to attract international 
media attention and aid, and resulted in a 
very different approach to deal with Syrian 
refugees.13 
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Jordan’s Refugee 
Population 
Results of the General Census of Population 
and Housing in Jordan of 30 November 
2015 indicate that the Jordanian population 
growth rate between 2004 and 2015 was 
5.3%, 18% for non-Jordanians versus 3.1% 
for Jordanians. This development is 
undoubtedly linked to the increased influx of 
migrants into Jordan during that period.  
Since the beginning of the Syrian war in 
2011, Jordan hosted the largest population of 
Palestinians and Iraqis, and the third largest 
population of Syrians. In February 2018, 
reports recorded that Jordan had the second 
highest share of refugees compared to its 
population in the world, namely 89 refugees 
per 1,000 inhabitants.14 
According to the UNHCR, refugees 
(including Palestinian refugees who have the 
Jordanian nationality) accounted for about 
30% of the total Jordanian population which 
comprises approximately 9,5 million persons 
according to the latest General Census.15 As 
of April 2018, there were an estimated 
661,859 people of concern from Syria, over 
2 million from Palestine and up to 1 million 
Iraqi refugees surviving in Jordan. 
Jordan’s Legal 
Framework on 
Refugees before the 
Syrian Conflict 
The Absence of a Domestic Legal 
Framework for Refugees   
Jordan has not signed the 1951 Geneva 
Convention nor the 1967 Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees. The country’s 
Constitution only provides protection 
against extradition for political asylum 
seekers in its article 21(1).16 
In the absence of a specific legislation 
addressing their status; refugees and asylum 
seekers in Jordan are subject to Law No. 24 
of 1973 concerning Residency and 
Foreigners’ Affairs. However, this law does 
not make the distinction between refugees 
and non-refugees. Refugees are considered 
as foreigners, which are defined in article 2 
as anyone who does not have Jordanian 
nationality.17  
The Hashemite Kingdom’s legal framework 
for the treatment of refugees is based on the 
1998 Memorandum of Understanding 
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(MoU)18 signed between Jordan and the 
UNHCR, and other bilateral agreements. 
The 1998 Memorandum of Understanding 
Between Jordan and the UNHCR   
In the Memorandum Jordan accepts the 
definition of “refugee” contained in the 1951 
Convention. The kingdom also agrees to 
respect the principle of non-refoulement, 
which states that “no person seeking asylum 
can be forced to return to a country where 
his/her life or freedom could be threatened 
because of his/her race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or 
political opinion”.19 Finally, Jordan 
recognises that asylum seekers and refugees 
should receive treatment according to 
internationally accepted standards.  
However, the MoU describes the presence of 
refugees as a "sojourn”. It allows refugees “a 
maximum stay of six months after 
recognition, during which a durable solution 
should be found”. Here, “solution” refers to 
either repatriation or return.  
In 2014, two articles of the MoU were 
amended in order to extend the time for the 
UNHCR to process refugee applications to 
ninety days. The validity of refugee 
identification cards was also extended from 
six months up to one year. Yet, the duration 
of refugees’ stay in Jordan was not amended 
and should not exceed six months.20 
Nevertheless, most refugees have been able 
to renew their residencies in Jordan after 
their six-month stay ends.21 
Syrian Refugees in 
Jordan 
At the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 
March 2011, Syrian refugees who sought 
refuge in Jordan were 283,215. The 
registration trend boomed in 2012 (+72.5%) 
and 2013 (+15%). By the end of the year 
2013, the number of Syrians reached 
576,354 and progressively peaked to 
661,859 in April 2018. However, not all 
Syrian refugees are registered with the 
UNHCR, and they are believed to be about 
1,5 million in Jordan.22 
The figures released by the UNHCR for 
2017 show positive trends as registrations 
and arrivals are slowing down (respectively 
+0.4% and +0.3%).23 Moreover, around 
8,000 Syrians are believed to have returned 
home in 2017 only.24 Most went after a local 
truce was reached in part of southern Syria 
in July.  
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Syrians who fled the conflict in their home 
country come mainly from Dar’a, at the 
border with Jordan, and major Syrian cities 
of Homs, Damascus and Aleppo. In Jordan, 
about 80% of Syrian refugees live in urban, 
peri-urban, and rural areas. The remaining 
20% is encamped in three main refugee 
camps: Za’atari Camp in Mafraq 
governorate and EJ and Azraq Camps in 
Zarqa governorate. Because of its 
geographical proximity with Syria, the north 
of the kingdom has become home for almost 
90% of the Syrian refugees. This comprises 
Amman (28.7%), Mafraq (24.4%), Irbid 
(21.0%) and Zarqa governorates (15.3%).  
In spite of the efforts made by the Jordanian 
government and the support of UNHCR and 
other external donors to cope with the 
massive influx of refugees, over 80% 
Syrians live below the poverty line. 
Moreover, 50.6% of them are children under 
17 years old and another 29.2% has one or 
more specific need.25 
 
 
Jordan’s Syrian 
Refugees Policies 
Open-doors Policy  
At the onset of the Syrian crisis in 2011, the 
kingdom was relatively open and tolerant to 
Syrians. This is due to historically open 
policies towards Syrian migration and 
refugees in general. Yet, the purpose of such 
open-policy until 2013 was to display a 
neutral position of non-interference in the 
conflict between the Syrian government and 
opposition groups. In July 2012, the 
Jordanian government opened the Za’atari 
refugee camp in the north of the country 
only a few miles from the border with Syria. 
The camp had an initial capacity of 9,000 
refugees in 1,800 tents.26 
Syrian refugees, thus, found safe haven in 
Jordan and were welcomed. The government 
still adopted some restrictions on the right to 
work and strongly incentivised refugees to 
settle in camps rather than in urban areas. 
Palestinian refugees who had found refuge 
in Syria before the conflict were less 
welcomed. Reports showed that the 
Jordanian government attempted to deport 
Palestinians who entered without 
documents.27 
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From 2013, as the conflict in Syria 
escalated, Jordan started to securitise Syrian 
refugees. In March 2014, the government 
created the Syrian Refugee Camp 
Directorate (SRCD) in order to control 
movements in and out refugee camps. In 
April 2014, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) 
replaced it with the Syrian Refugee Affairs 
Directorate (SRAD) as a branch of Jordan’s 
security services. The new Directorate has 
the mission of policing Syrian refugees 
inside and outside camps. In May 2014, 
Jordan opened its sixth and largest camp for 
Syrians. This policy echoes the previous 
strategy to deal with Iraqi refugees and was 
thought as a way to increase international 
visibility and to attract international 
assistance through encampment. In an 
interview given in March 2017, the 
Jordanian security official in charge of the 
Azraq refugee camp explained: “If we had 
not built the camps, then the world would 
not understand that we were going through a 
crisis”.28 
The Creation of a Legal Framework to 
Support Host Communities  
Since 2013, the Government of Jordan took 
a proactive role in seeking to respond to the 
challenges of the Syrian refugee crisis. In 
June 2014, the Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation (MoPIC) 
formulated the National Resilience Plan 
(NRP), a three-year program supported by 
development and humanitarian agencies 
operating in Jordan. The NRP focuses on 
addressing the impact of the Syrian refugee 
crisis on the country and host communities. 
Jordan planned to invest US$2.41 billion 
over three years to local institutions and 
communities in the following sectors: 
health, education, water & sanitation, 
livelihood & employment, energy, housing, 
and social protection.29 
In parallel to the development of the NRP, in 
September 2014 Jordan Response Platform 
for the Syria Crisis (JRPSC) was established 
to “coordinate, guide and provide oversight 
to the preparation, implementation and 
monitoring of the JRP 2015 and the JRP 
2016”.30 Jordan Response Plan (JRP) was 
launched in December 2014 as a one-year 
program. The plan is underpinned by three 
main principles: mitigate the impact of the 
Syrian refugee crisis on host communities, 
sustain socio economic stability, and 
safeguard the development gains made in 
recent years. Similarly to the NRP, the JRP 
outlined almost US$3 billion to be injected 
in eleven strategic sectors. Donor 
contributions to the plan are coordinated 
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through a unified channel, the Jordan 
Resilience Fund (JRF) launched by Jordan 
and the UN.31 The JRP 2015 was renewed 
for another three years. The JRP 2016-2018 
has two pillars: Refugees and Resilience.  
Finally, Jordan signed the Regional Refugee 
and Resilience Plan (3RP) launched in 
December 2014 by the Arab Republic of 
Egypt, the Republic of Iraq, the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, the Lebanese Republic 
and the Republic of Turkey. The plan aims 
to ensure protection, humanitarian assistance 
and strengthen resilience.32 It is aligned with 
existing national plans, in the case of Jordan, 
the Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis 
2016-2018. 
The Increased Securitisation of Syrian 
Refugees and IS’ Spectre  
From June 2013, Jordan closed all its 
informal western border crossings, forcing 
Syrian refugees to travel to informal 
crossings along the eastern side of the border 
to avoid checkpoints.33 
The turning point of Jordan’s policies on 
Syrian refugees came with the growing 
influence and violence committed by IS in 
Syria from September 2014. Jordan 
responded to the threat with increased 
securitisation of the Syrian refugees and 
with greater restrictions. The governmental 
policy was echoed by public opinion. A 
2014 poll showed that nearly 80% of 
Jordanians was opposed to receiving more 
refugees.34 
Several reports pointed to many instances of 
massive refoulement and the suspension of 
registration for new arrivals at the border.35 
Thousands of Syrians were turned away and 
abandoned in a demilitarised area known as 
“the berms”. By April 2015, the last formal 
crossing with Syria was closed by the 
Jordanian government after Syrian rebel 
fighters took control of it.  
On the international stage, the Hashemite 
Kingdom raised its voice to denounce the 
inadequacy of international responsibility-
sharing. It urged European countries to 
financially support the hosting of over one 
million Syrian refugees.  
It is important to note that a major donor to 
Jordan is Japan who gave approximately 
US$59 million to international organisations 
operating in Jordan so far. In 2017, the 
country gave US$1.494 million grant to the 
UN Office for Project Services in order to 
finance a project called “Improving Safety 
and Security for Syrian Refugees at the 
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Refugee Camps in Jordan”. In a public 
statement, Shuichi Sakurai, ambassador of 
Japan, said that “Japan has acknowledged 
that security is one of top priorities in 
managing refugee camps; because assistance 
for the refugees, who are living in severe 
condition, can be provided only under a 
secure and safe environment”.36 
The Cooperation with International Donors 
and the Humanisation of Syrian Refugees  
In February 2016 at the London Pledging 
Summit, Jordan and the European Union 
concluded “the Jordan Compact” deal to 
support Syrian refugees in Jordan. The 
agreement focused on integrating Syrian 
refugees in the labour market. Jordan 
softened its strict regulations on refugees’ 
right to work. For example, work permit fees 
were cut from JD700 to JD10 for several 
low-skilled sectors such as agriculture, 
construction, and manufacturing. In return, 
the donor community committed to better 
support the Jordan Response Plan, which by 
2016 was only 30% funded.37 
Jordan also pledged to create up to 200,000 
work opportunities for Syrian refugees. 
More specifically, the Jordan Compact 
entails a model designed to help Jordan 
integrating refugees into pre-existing Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs). In order to 
facilitate this integration, the EU has offered 
tariff free access to European markets on 
condition that businesses in Jordan employ a 
certain proportion of Syrian refugees. Those 
businesses should also produce in at least 
one Jordanian SEZ and in specific product 
categories. Furthermore, for the first time, 
the World Bank offered a Concessionary 
Finance Initiative to Jordan, providing low-
interest loans.38 
As of December 2017, the Government of 
Jordan has taken necessary steps to open 
formal employment opportunities to Syrians. 
In 2017 alone, 46,000 work permits were 
issued in sectors approved for foreign 
workers.39 Syrians have also been formally 
entitled to work outside the camps for up to 
one month before returning to renew their 
paperwork.  
Regarding the SEZs, fewer permits have 
been issued. USAID and DFID have funded 
the identification of 300 existing 
manufacturers within the SEZs. Meanwhile, 
the UNHCR collaborated with the Jordanian 
Investment Authority to engage Jordanian 
firms. Job fairs are now regularly organised 
in refugee camps, especially in Za’atari, in 
collaboration with the Norwegian Red Cross 
and the Syrian Refugee Affairs 
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Directorate.40 Jordan should still increase its 
efforts in ensuring fair working conditions 
for Syrians. Another challenge is to attract 
multinational corporations (MNCs) to 
establish factories in Jordan and employ 
Syrian refugees as well as Jordanians. 
To conclude, at a national level, the Jordan 
Compact has proven the sustained 
commitment of the Jordanian government to 
invest in Syrian refugees and see them as an 
opportunity for national development.  
Policy Variations at the Sub-National Level  
At the sub-national level, identity and 
interests factors shape the variation in 
policies towards Syrian refugees.41 As for 
identity, tribal affiliation and the historical 
relationship between the tribes at the two 
sides of the borders have been influential. It 
explains that the northern governorates of 
Mafraq, Sahab and Zarqa were relatively 
more open even though they faced massive 
arrival of Syrians. Moreover, the perception 
of economic opportunity – to seek resources 
from the central government to cope with 
the influx – have encouraged several mayors 
to have a pro-active politics to integrate 
refugees. 
The Socio Economic 
Impact of Syrian 
Refugees on Jordan 
It is important to differentiate the effects of 
tensions and insecurity that exist in the 
Middle East and the effects of the refugee 
crisis as such. In Jordan, regional changes 
had major impact on tourism, foreign 
investment, the interruption of arrival of gas 
from Egypt and the reduction of exchange of 
goods between Jordan and Syria to reach 
Europe. For example, the loss of major trade 
routes with Syria has caused a 9% loss in 
Jordan’s trade balance in 2012 only.42  
The rapid growth of the Jordanian 
population inexorably led to the increased 
competition for access to public services, 
infrastructures, and jobs. Jordan Independent 
Economy Watch summarised the main 
socio-economics impact of the Syrian 
refugee crisis as follow: 1) Increasing costs 
of various sectors such as education, health, 
shelter, water, energy and housing, 2) 
Increasing pressure on public finances, 3) 
Exacerbating vulnerabilities for the poorest 
segments of the Jordanian population, and 4) 
Threatening the sustainability of quality 
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service provision in the most affected 
governorates.43 
Macro-economic Impact 
According to Planning and International 
Cooperation Minister Imad Fakhoury, the 
direct financial impact of the crisis is 
estimated at around US$2 billion annually, 
which equates to 20% of the total annual 
national revenue and 5% of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).44 As for indirect 
impact, they are estimated to reach US$3.5 
billion annually by the UN Development 
Program (UNDP).45 
The rapid and massive increase of the 
population in Jordan after the influx of 
Syrian refugees inexorably put pressure on 
public services and infrastructures. Hosting 
one million individuals increased 
government’s expenses across several 
sectors. Moreover, the Hashemite Kingdom 
drastically increased its imports of goods 
and resources, such as electricity and water 
to meet the need of its refugee and non-
refugee population.  
Economic growth dropped when the global 
financial crisis hit Jordan in late 2008. 
Jordan’s economy was greatly impacted by 
the external shock and the country’s GDP 
was in decline until 2013. The economic 
growth experienced a great rebound in 2014. 
This is due to private consumption from 
both Jordanians and Syrian refugees, foreign 
investments and the relocation of many 
Syrian businesses in Jordan. In Irbid for 
example twelve factories specialised in food 
manufacturing relocated from Syria between 
2011 and 2015.46 Moreover, Syrian 
investments represent a large share of total 
foreign direct investments (FDI) in Jordan. 
In 2013 only, Syrian invested a total of 
JD34.8 million in almost 1,000 companies in 
Jordan.47 Although the protracted nature of 
the Syrian conflict led Syrians to invest 
outside of Jordan after 2014, they still 
represent a large share of FDI. In 2014, the 
Jordanian government introduced a series of 
measures in order to re-attract and boost 
Syrian investments. Finally, in 2014, Syrians 
invested JD28.5 million in real estate, 256% 
more than in 2010. That same year, they 
ranked third among foreigners purchasing 
apartments in Jordan.48 
In 2012, Jordan experienced a major 
increase in debt, as a share of the GDP. This 
corresponds to the peak of an energy crisis 
and the start of inflows of Syrian refugees in 
the kingdom. The fact that the net public 
debt steadily increased in 2013 and 2014 
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shows the pressure of Syrian refugees on the 
government expenses. However, Ministry of 
Planning and International Cooperation 
stated that the refugee burden is not the 
cause of the increase in debt. Instead, it 
exacerbated existing pressures on public 
finances, further inflating the budget.49 
Syrian refugees also have a positive impact 
on the public revenues and aid perceived by 
Jordan. For each Jordanian Dinar spent by a 
Syrian refugee from the assistance he/she 
receives, a certain percentage of this Dinar is 
reaped by the government in the form of a 
tax. This is the case when a Syrian refugee 
buys a work permit and renews residency 
visa. The revenue generated from work 
permit bought by Syrian refugees only 
amounted to JD85 million in 2014.50 A 
study realised in 2013 estimated that the 
benefit of the Syrian refugee crisis would 
cumulatively reach around JD2 billion for 
public revenues only.51 The same study 
found that Jordanian public revenues 
accrued from the hosting of Syrian refugees 
amounted JD780 million in 2013.  
Furthermore, Jordan has received large 
amounts of foreign aid from the 
international community in order to cope 
with the inflows of Syrian refugees. While 
determining the exact figure for the aid 
received is impossible, some reports states 
that the kingdom received around US$2.8 
billion in 2016.52 This excludes additional 
humanitarian aid and the budget of aid 
agencies working in Jordan. While financial 
assistance was motivated by the Syrian 
refugee crisis, much of it has been allocated 
to Jordanian host communities. According to 
official data of MoPIC, the amount of 
foreign aid pledged to Jordan in 2012 and 
after is more than the double compared to 
the amount the kingdom received before the 
Syrian refugee crisis. Official figures states 
that in 2012, Jordan received $US3.05 
billion, which represents an increase of 
300% compared to 2011.53 
Impact by Economic Sector  
Numerous social and political reforms which 
had been initiated before the Syrian conflict 
were paused by the massive influx of Syrian 
refugees. Competition over access to public 
services and infrastructures has caused 
tensions in the population.  
Jordan is one of the most energy-dependant 
countries in the world, accounting for about 
97% of its energy needs. Continuous 
disruptions in energy imports from Egypt, 
and the non-encampment of Syrian refugees 
aggravated the energy consumption level. 
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However, energy is subsidised by the 
Jordanian government, which spent US$5.9 
billion, or 18.5% of its GDP, in order to 
provide energy in 2014.54 According to the 
last JRP 2018-2010, it is estimated that 
during the five first years of the crisis (2011-
2015), government subsidies for petroleum 
and electricity reached US$7.1 billion.55 
While the total residential electricity 
consumption increased by 34% between 
2011 and 2016, the per capita energy 
consumption decreased by 18% over the 
same period. It shows that both Jordanian 
and Syrian face severe restrictions in the 
access to this public service.56 
As half of the Syrian refugee population are 
under the age of 18, the crisis has 
considerably increased the educational 
demand in Jordan. The impact has been 
particularly strong on public schooling. 
From the onset of Syrian refugees influx, 
Jordan invested US$200 million to enrol 
126,127 Syrian children in public schools.57 
In school year 2015/2016, 143,000 Syrian 
students were enrolled in public schools. In 
spite of those efforts, 40% of Syrian school-
age children remain deprived from education 
in Jordan. The crisis has led to heavy 
pressures on the education system. Public 
schools have become saturated, especially in 
high population density areas. Teachers have 
to cover double shifts without receiving fair 
financial compensation, which means that 
children spend less time in the classroom. 
Finally, the recruitment of additional 
teaching staff is a burden on public finances. 
All those constraints impede the quality of 
education and teaching in the country for 
both Syrians and Jordanians. 
The Jordanian government granted free 
access to public health services for Syrian 
refugees. This led to an increase on the 
demand, needs and costs of healthcare 
system. Moreover, health centres are 
suffering from a shortage of medicines and 
vaccines. Between the beginning of the 
influx and 2016, around 630,000 Syrian 
refugees were admitted in public hospitals.58 
Congestion over health services led 
Jordanians to turn to private centres and 
hospitals, which are less accessible and more 
expensive. JRP 2018-2020 points to the 
increase in the rates of non-communicable 
diseases, disability and mental health 
problems that stem from the change in 
population demographic.59 Syrian refugees 
also have brought the resurgence of 
communicable diseases that had been 
eradicated for years in Jordan such as 
tuberculosis; poliomyelitis and measles. In 
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order to overcome the tensions over health 
access, the Jordanian government granted 
universal and free access to health care for 
Jordanians, while Syrian refugees were no 
longer entitle to free medical services.60 
In terms of food security, up to 26% of the 
Jordanian population, especially in host 
communities, are considered food insecure 
or vulnerable to food insecurity.61 As for 
Syrian refugees, over 70% of households 
living outside of refugee camps are almost 
completely dependent on food assistance. 
Such assistance is mainly provided by the 
international community through food 
vouchers, ad hoc in-kind assistance, and 
meals to schoolchildren. Data of the 
Ministry of Finance show that the total 
amount of food subsidies provided by the 
government in the first five months of 2015 
amounts to JD71.6 million. Furthermore, the 
massive influx of refugees has led to the 
increase in food demand, with two main 
effects. First, the increase in imports of basic 
food resources such as wheat. Second, 
consumer food prices have increased by 
15.5% between 2009 and 2016.62 
In 2018, 1,36 million individuals living in 
Jordan still lack access to adequate housing, 
of which 69% is Jordanian and 31% are 
Syrian refugees.63 In addition, the influx of 
Syrian refugees in Jordan and the fact that 
80% of them lives outside camps has led to 
sub-division of existing units and to the 
significant rise of rent prices, especially in 
northern Jordan.64 In Mafraq and Ramtha for 
example, some rents have increased six 
times the price before the refugee crisis, and 
on average, house prices have tripled.65 
Competition for affordable and decent 
housing has become a main source of 
tension between Syrian refugees and host 
communities. 
Water scarcity was an issue long before the 
Syrian refugee crisis, since Jordan is the 
third country in the world with the least 
water resources.66 Before the refugee influx, 
Jordan was already suffering from pressure 
on the demand for potable water. Half of 
Jordan supply comes from Yarmouk River 
and the other half comes from the 
exploitation of groundwater. The increased 
demand led to the increased exploitation of 
underground water and ultimately water 
levels are lowering while water quality if 
deteriorating.67 In northern areas, the 
average daily supply has fallen below 30 
litters per person, well below what is 
recommended to meet a person's basic needs 
(50 litters per person).68 The crisis has also 
put pressure on the already limited sewage 
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and communal waste system, which covers 
only 62% of the Jordanian population.69 
The main environmental impact of the 
refugee influx is 1) deforestation and 
firewood depletion, 2) land degradation, 3) 
unsustainable groundwater extraction, and 4) 
water pollution.70 Not only do the refugees 
have a negative impact on the environment, 
but the environmental deterioration has an 
adverse impact on refugees. For instance, 
settlements in flood zones and the increase 
of solid wastes intensified the pollution of 
surface and ground water, which is a major 
cause for the transmission of diarrheal 
disease. 
Impact on the Labour Market  
The competition over access to the labour 
market has raised the bigger debate in 
Jordan. The most tangible impact of Syrian 
refugees is seen on the existing job 
opportunities, wage level, working 
conditions, as well as the accessibility to 
work. Some voices consider that the 
presence of Syrian refugees in the country is 
the main cause of rising unemployment. 
According to an International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) survey, 96% of 
Jordanians considers that the Syrians are 
taking jobs away from the local 
population.71 In northern areas such as 
Mafraq, Amman and Irbid, unemployment 
has increased from 14.5% in 2011 to 22.1% 
in 2014. This is in spite of the fact that 
Syrian refugees were legally not allowed to 
work in Jordan until 2016.  
However, the ILO study shows that Syrians 
have occupied 160,000 jobs on the black 
market, especially in the agriculture, 
construction, and service sectors – the same 
sectors that have shown impressive growth 
since the beginning of the crisis.72 Between 
2010 and 2013, unemployment grew in the 
economy while the shadow economy 
experienced an increase in jobs, which is 
where Syrians are able to work (Ministry of 
Planning and International Cooperation, 
2013).73 As of April 2017, 18.6% of 
Jordanians was still unemployed, including 
30% of the youth. While there is no proof 
that Syrians directly compete with 
Jordanians in the access to the labour 
market, they directly compete with other 
immigrants such as Egyptians and 
Sudanese.74 Moreover, a 2017 report of the 
ILO affirms that the low working condition 
accepted by Syrian refugees put Jordanian 
workers at a disadvantage.75 
The report explains that the arrival of Syrian 
refugees has changed the dynamics of the 
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Jordanian labour market. The latter is now 
constituted of three groups: Jordanians, 
migrant workers, and refugees. It is 
segmented based on nationalities rather than 
education or skills. Moreover, family 
situation matters. While migrants came to 
Jordan alone on a temporary basis and will 
send part of their salary back to their home 
countries, Jordanians and Syrians need to 
balance employment with family 
responsibilities and will spend their wages in 
Jordan. Data from the Ministry of Labour 
recently suggested that there might be as 
many non-Jordanians as Jordanians working 
in the Hashemite Kingdom. This 
demographic change of the labour market 
poses three main challenges to the Jordanian 
government: 1) how to increase Jordanian 
employment, 2) how to ensure decent 
working conditions for all workers, 
including migrant workers and refugees, and 
3) how to incorporate Syrian refugees 
without displacing the two other groups? 
Political Impact   
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is based 
on the tribal structures of the country. While 
the demographics have been altered 
dramatically by the influx of Syrian 
refugees, political structures remained 
unchanged. One example on how Syrian 
refugee may affect the political legitimacy in 
Jordan is the nationality law. Legally, 
Jordanian women do not have the right to 
grant their own nationality to their child. 
Therefore, when a Jordanian woman has a 
child from a non-Jordanian man, the child 
cannot be considered Jordanian. Many of 
those cases already occurred with the 
increasing Palestinian population in Jordan 
and the occurrence of mixed marriages. It is 
likely that the next generation of individuals 
leaving in Jordan will not have the Jordanian 
nationality and thus, will constitute an 
unrepresented “second class”. This fringe of 
the population may eventually question the 
legitimacy of the government; ask for more 
rights or a status equal to the one of 
Jordanians, which might ultimately lead to 
social upheavals in the future. 
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